class hierarchies, in particular with reference to work disciplines in capitalist society 3 . However, systematic biases against offending workers have never been demonstrated at petty sessional level in the nineteenth-century, possibly because of the unsatisfactory nature of the available record sources 4 . In order to present a new perspective on the use of sentencing dispositions against labour, this article will use the detailed records of the private employer-controlled nineteenth-century agency 5 which attempted to eradicate illegal workplace appropriation or «theft» 6 in the northern textile districts. By utilizing these sources, this article will be able to offer more substantial conclusions concerning the partiality of magistrates in one of the largest and most important industrial regions of mid-nineteenth-century England. In particular, it will consider the impact that the changing social and occupational composition of the West Yorkshire magistracy had on the conviction rates and disposal of workplace appropriators in the mid-nineteenth-century.
There, is of course, a discussion to be had about the role of State agencies in «refereeing» private disputes in private arenas e.g. factory workspaces, and the public «good» that may or may not accrue when both public and private law enforcement agencies combine in this manner. This is too large (and important) a debate to be encompassed within this article. Indeed, the most fruitful approach would be a Europe-wide survey both of the existence and operation of factory workers' customary right to take home workplace materials, and of the responses of the various governments and policing agencies involved in curtailing or accommodating those real or imagined rights. This kind of investigation would be of benefit not only to European social historians, but also help to place into context a significant part of English crime history research. For now, however, we must content ourselves with a thorough exploration of the English experience.
I.
As with most offences, there was a statutorily determined punishment framework for workplace appropriation, which is outlined in Table 1 . However, despite there being seven acts passed in this period which could have been used for the prosecution of workplace embezzlers, the 1777 Worsted Acts 7 , as they were known, (17 3 See Emsley (1996), p. 121-150, Trainor (1993), Hay (1983) , Styles (1983) , . 4 For example, the usefulness of the only sets of archival data which could reveal judicial biases against industrial labour -records of Master and Servant and Factory Acts prosecutions -are limited since neither national nor local master and servant statistics survive, or ever existed, for much of the nineteenth-century. Similarly, Factory Act prosecution records, despite being the subject of a considerable amount of study, have not produced a consensus on the partiality of their application. See Carson (1970 Carson ( ,1979 ; Bartrip, Fenn (1983) ; Nardinelli (1985) , Bartrip (1985) ; Peacock (1985) .
5
The Worsted Committee and their Inspectors were a private, state-funded, detection and prosecution agency which was in operation between 1777 and 1965. The Committee kept quantifiable records of the prosecutions they launched between 1844 and 1876, as well as considerable qualitative material concerning judicial decisions made in those prosecutions.
6
Workplace appropriation was the illegal taking home of materials which employees came upon during the process of manufacture.
7
Worsted was a type of wool used by manufactures in the West Riding of Yorshire, and in parts of Cheshire and Lancashire in cloth production.
Geo. III c.56) 8 and the Committee responsible for prosecuting the legislation (created by 17 Geo.III c.11) were the primary weapons used by the employers 9 . The main clauses of 17 Geo. III c.56 proscribed the mere possession of woollen or worsted Table T . The punishment structure for illegal workplace appropriation, 1777-1875 goods whose ownership was in dispute, as well as the selling/buying of embezzled workplace materials. In order to detect and prosecute infringements of the act a Committee of the most powerful worsted manufacturers in Yorkshire, Lancashire
References to English laws follow the convention of first giving the year of the reign in wich the act was passed, followed by the name of the reigning monarch (in the case the act was passed in 1777, the seventeenth year of the reign of George the Third). Approximately 184 workers per year were prosecuted in petty sessions courts under the Worsted Acts between 1844 and 1853, when the Committee was at its most active, whereas only approximately thirty workers per year were prosecuted under larceny statutes at quarter sessions between 1840 and 1855, after which the 1855 Criminal Justice Act removed most of even that small number to petty sessions jurisdiction. However, should one wish to reveal judicial biases, these general patterns of punishments may be less useful than an analysis of the sentences imposed on particular occupational groups. Rag dealers or gatherers, waste dealers or fudders, scrapdealers, and pawnbrokers were repeatedly condemned by West Riding magistrates for providing an outlet for the sale of embezzled goods, and thereby encouraging the crime. Indeed, some justices declared the dealers to be worse than the «thieves» themselves, and wished that they could be eradicated or «put down» like animals 14 . Do these comments indicate that waste and scrap dealers received disproportionately harsh treatment at the hands of magistrates, and if they did, does that mean that judicial biases had intervened in the application of justice?
In order to test this, the occupations of convicted appropriators have been grouped into three categories. As Table 3 reveals, pawnbrokers and dealers did receive the heaviest penalties, and, since the table excludes the offences of buying and selling appropriated goods which attracted severe sentences, the relatively harsh penalties for dealers can only be explained in three possible ways.
10
Although, in reality the majority of Committee members were drawn from the major worsted producing regions of Bradford and Halifax.
11
For an early history of the Worsted Committee see Soderlund (1998) and, for the later period, see First, it is possible that approximately a fifth of the convicted dealers had previous convictions and consequently received heavier penalties. This is unlikely, since convicted pawnbrokers and dealers would have received heavy attention from the police, and would have found it difficult to keep trading. An alternative explanation is that the magistrates imposed more severe penalties solely because of the occupation of the accused. However, if that was the case, why was the conviction rate for pawnbrokers/dealers (65.3%) lower than that of factory employees (76.9%)? One reason is that the evidence against factory workers tended to be very strong -many employees, for example, were apprehended with appropriated material on their person, or hidden in their houses, which were was difficult to explain away. Moreover, dealers had more reasons to have unmarked cloth on their premises, which lessened the impact of circumstantial evidence, and one supposes that many could «rustle up» an invoice if one should be needed to prove ownership. The third, and most likely explanation, though it cannot be proven, is that those pawnbrokers who found themselves unable to escape conviction suffered heavier punishments to compensate for those that got away. Although they may not have had the chance to punish all the dealers they wished to, magistrates were sure to insist that the ones that they could reach received comparatively «stiff» penalties.
From the figures presented above, it seems that a direct causal link between the occupation of the defendant and the severity of their punishment cannot easily be established. However, this problem can be examined from other angles. For example, the rate of conviction for workplace appropriation, which was higher than that for comparable offences. Whereas the conviction rate for all cases prosecuted by the Worsted Committee between 1844-76 was 82.4%, the conviction rate for the offence of simple larceny at Bradford petty sessions between 1865 and 1870 was only 64.0%, and for the larceny of goods valued at less than five shillings it was only 62.0% 16 . From these statistics it is clear that the Worsted Acts had a much greater success rate than other comparable acts. Was this due to appropriation cases being judged by magistrates who made their money by manufacturing, and was the occupation of the magistrate a predictor of the trial result? By approximately 1830, under the pressure of rapid population growth and an expansion of judicial business, the Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire had been compelled, despite his own grave personal reservations, to appoint men engaged in commerce and manufacturing to the Bench 17 . Knipe suggests that he resisted this administrative imperative long into the nineteenth-century not because of his own prejudice against merchants and industrialists, but because he feared that manufacturing magistrates would not be able to act impartially in cases involving industrial workers 18 . This problem had, however, already presented itself, with rural landowning magistrates being markedly sympathetic to eighteenth-century cottage workers who had fallen foul of early anti-embezzlement laws, as John Styles has noted. Presumably the Lord Chancellor had not known of these problems of partiality, or had decided that the situation could only get worse when industrialists became involved in the business of justice 19 . However, despite the Lord Lieutenant's fears that the aristocratic and landed elements on the county benches would be swamped by industrialists, only 12.5% of those eligible to sit on the West Riding Bench came from the manufacturing and trade sections of Yorkshire society in the 1840 to 1880 period 20 . Similarly, in industrialized Lancashire, less than 5% of the county bench were manufacturers at the mid-point of the century 21 . Indeed, even if the manufacturers were disproportionately likely to convict workplace offenders, their influence could only have been slight at quarter sessions. Statistically, in those courts, there was only a one in eight likelihood that an appropriation trial would be attended by a manufacturer, and even then his influence would be mediated by his fellow justices. However, as previously stated, in the worsted-producing districts, appropriation cases were mainly tried at the petty sessional divisions. Only if sufficient evidence was available to prove a felony had taken place, would employers hazard the quarter sessions. Even then they may still have preferred summary justice, since jury trial was unreliable 22 . Approximately six hundred cases initiated by the Worsted Committee were tried at petty sessions in either Halifax, Bradford or East Morley (an area stretching nearly to Leeds, to Halifax and to Colne, excluding the borough of Bradford, which was under a separate jurisdiction from 1847). Those last two courts, which together dealt with all of Bradford's minor court cases, had three-hundred and seventy cases brought to them by the Worsted Committee in the 1844 to 1876 period. Those cases were judged by sets of magistrates who were drawn from similar social backgrounds. Moreover, they shared trade interests, with 80% of Bradford and East Morley's magistrates being millowners 23 .
There exists today a judicial principle that magistrates should not judge a case with any motivation other than the execution of justice. Self-interest on behalf of the magistrate is, in theory, precluded from the judicial process 24 . However, the vast majority of eighteenth and nineteenth-century statutes did not include clauses which prevented those magistrates who had an interest in any particular case from acting as judicial arbiters. Those statutes which did attempt to limit conflicts of interest in legal cases came mainly in the last quarter of the nineteenth-century. For example, the Bradford Observer reported in 1872 that:
Under the new Trade Union Act, the Bench were disqualified by the clause relating to jurisdiction, in so much as they were themselves engaged or interested in the cotton trade, out of which the dispute arose. The prosecution at Leigh was withdrawn as every magistrate in the division was covered by the clause 25 .
However, the boundaries of a magistrate's moral and legal jurisdiction were established in the main by case law not by statutes. It was ruled in 1851, for example, that magistrates who held shares in a company should not try cases involving that company 26 ; neither should magistrates try cases where they had a direct pecuniary interest, however small 27 . Further, it was held that there was a danger of substantial bias» when members of committees, boards or members of prosecution associations, acted as JPs in the trials of certain offenders where they might have an interest 28 . As these examples show, case law ruled only over very specific circumstances, but together these rulings and the reasoning which underlay them collectively established a more general code of conduct. This code was summed up in one case ruling: «it is highly desirable that justice should be administered by persons who cannot be suspected of improper motives» 29 . Furthermore, magistrates should not place themselves in a position where they are interested in promoting one particular verdict out of self-interest, «since no man may be a judge in his own case» 30 . These rulings and legal opinions often presumed they defended justice from an individual magistrate's greed, envy or prejudice, but they did not preclude magistrates from acting collectively from class interest, or with pejorative views shaped by the dominant societal views of the class from which most defendants emerged.
Judicial principles notwithstanding, there is an historical consensus that justices from particular occupational groups had a direct or indirect interest in some of the cases they judged. Moreover, it has been asserted that the existence of any such interest precluded any hope of a fair trial for the accused. In the East Midlands, for example, Chapman asserts that the factory owners used the summary courts simply as an extension of their private powers 31 . Similarly, in the West Midlands, Hay states that «the local magistracy and the great manufacturers saw eye to eye» 32 , and described how this close co-operation worked in practice:
So that lessons would not be lost, the firm could also rely on at least some occasions on the willingness of the bench to order punishment where it would do most good: in 1789 a thief they successfully prosecuted was then publicly whipped at the factory over a distance of 150 yards at noon hour, before being sent to the House of Correction for three months' hard labour 33 . 
III.
Heaton's assessment of the relationship between the magistrates and the manufacturers includes a curious paragraph. He asserts that the Worsted Committee had to contend with the ignorance, apathy, or actual hostility of the magistrates...Many cases which were brought forward by the inspectors were dismissed by magistrates who did not know the nature of the Worsted Acts, and the committee was constantly printing digests of the law, handbills &c, or sending deputations to explain to these benighted justices the wonders of the statutes. But knowledge when it came, did not convince the local authorities of the error of their ways. Doubtless they objected to being taught their duty by an upstart industrial organization 36 .
In his monograph, Heaton had previously made a strong case for the potency of manufacturing interest in judicial affairs. Clearly, however, there were a number of tensions within the «strange alliance» 37 . Both the Worsted Inspectors and the Factory Inspectors complained that magistrates, either through ignorance or complicity 38 , were obstructive of prosecution cases brought against employers 39 . In his exasperation one complainant conflated two possible reasons for their truculence. . With the majority of failed cases, however, the Inspectors strove to find reasons to explain their lack of success, and the ignorance of magistrates was as good a reason as any 43 . It seems unlikely that, as an Inspector alleged in one case, neither the clerk of the court, the defending advocate nor any of the magistrates understood the provisions of the Worsted Acts since they had all witnessed so many cases brought under those Acts 44 . However, this reason was possibly more palatable to the Committee than accepting that magistrates opposed the Worsted Acts per se. Nevertheless, some magistrates did make statements which revealed a clear understanding of, and contempt for, the provisions of the 1777 Acts. It is therefore worthwhile examining these statements in order to understand why some magistrates held the Worsted Acts to be morally repugnant.
First, it must be understood that the statements made by magistrates in court, and occasionally rehearsed in the Bradford Observer were not part of a coherent attack on the Worsted Committee and their works. Nor was there ever a co-ordinated attack made on the Worsted Acts by the whole, or by a significant section of the magistrates. The focus of the magistrates' criticism was dispersed, and reflected concern over the plight of the poor working people, as much as anti-manufacturing rhetoric, or a desire to reform the laws regulating workplace appropriation. pensation on the advice of the Worsted Inspector. It is possible that the settlement was considered by the Inspector to be preferable to a court case made uncertain by a notoriously obstructive magistrate 47 , and, in fact, the proportion of Pollard's cases which were settled before the trial is more than double the average 48 . Certainly Inspectors feared and resented particular magistrates -one Inspector going so far as to refuse to divulge to an obstructive magistrate that he worked for the Worsted Committee for fear that the prosecution would then fail 49 . Better by far, for the Inspectors, to find magistrates more sympathetic to their cause. Edward Lister, for example, one of the eighty manufacturers who judged appropriation cases in West Yorkshire between 1840 and 1880, who regularly held summary hearings in an extension of his own home 50 ; or Mr. Holdsworth, a member of the Worsted Committee, who tried his workers inside his own factory 51 . It is little wonder that these men were concerned with the control of appropriation, their membership of the Worsted Committee proved as much. But were such men blinded to justice inside the courthouse by their own interests?
IV.
There is a strong suggestion that the «strange alliance» between the magistrates and the Worsted Committee mine the issue of judicial impartiality by use of qualitative data alone. Fortunately, the Committee's minute books recorded the names of the petty sessions' magistrates who convicted or dismissed appropriators, which has allowed a quantitative analysis of the occupational bias of magistrates to be constructed.
V.
The Worsted Acts required two magistrates to sit in judgement, and in 77% of the prosecutions brought by the Worsted Committee at least one of the magistrates was a manufacturer, while 21% were judged by two manufacturers. In addition, between 1844 and 1876, 27% of the magistrates who tried appropriation cases were also members of the Worsted Committee 56 . Moreover, in approximately 3% (22 cases) of all prosecutions brought by the Worsted Committee, both magistrates were Committee members, and in most of those cases, both of the magistrates had attended the Worsted Committee meeting immediately preceding the trial. Not only did those magistrates have an implicit interest in the case as manufacturers, but they had already discussed the case with the Worsted Inspector and the victim of the appropriation. Indeed the Committee would not have proceeded with the prosecution had they not decided that there was a good likelihood of conviction. Unless the potential arbiters of the case sat at Committee meetings blindfolded, with their hands over their ears, they would have had at the very least a good knowledge of the case before it reached the courts.
Given that a significant proportion of the magistrates who tried appropriation cases were manufacturers in the same line of business as the prosecutor, sat on a committee which decided whether to prosecute offenders, and had an indirect commercial interest in the outcome of the case, it would seem that the previously described legal principles were not adhered to. Indeed, many attempts to complain that magistrates had a direct interest in appropriation cases were ignored 57 . But this would only seem to matter if magistrates exerted undue influence over the outcome of trials. What evidence is there that this was the case?
The statistics taken from the Worsted Committee Registers and portrayed in Table 4 are somewhat surprising given the previously described remarks of Chapman, Hay and Trainor. There was no completely consistent link between abnormally high conviction rates and manufacturing magistrates». Conviction rates were 12% below average in the small number of cases in which neither of the magistrates was a textile manufacturer, and were 5.4% above average when at least one of the two adjudicators was such a manufacturer. However, cases in which both magistrates were textile masters had only average conviction rates and most surprising of all, when both magistrates belonged to the Worsted Committee, the conviction rate was only 72.7%. This was slightly (3%) below the conviction rates of summary cases involving either Joshua Pollard or William Murgatroyd, two magistrates notoriously antagonistic to the Worsted Committee, and 10% below the overall average 58 .
Again, no consistent causal link between the occupation of the magistrates and the conviction rate of appropriators can therefore be established through statistical analysis -the occupation of the magistrate had some impact but is not a clear predictor of the likelihood of conviction. Did more subtle factors exist which affected the statistics? There are a number of possible explanations for the apparent lack of occupational bias in the magistrates' treatment of appropriators. First, almost all of the magistrates in the textile districts may have made assumptions about the characters of factory employees which lead the majority of magistrates to convict them in large proportions 60 . Worsted Committee members, manufacturers, magistrates and employers of all kinds may have shared not only similar views on the nature of appropriation, but also informal and formal social networks 61 . These associations obviously could not «bind» elites together into a homogenous whole, whose members thought and acted the same way. Trade competition and personal rivalries between various magistrates were undoubtedly a factor from time to time. Nevertheless, generally it can be assumed that magistrates of all occupations disapproved of appropriation whoever the victim, and shared with the Worsted Committee many of the underlying assumptions concerning the protection of manufacturers' property.
Membership of the Worsted Committee involved more than attending an annual dinner, however. Most members attended the quarterly meetings for long periods of time, where they discussed the best ways of prosecuting appropriation. Only a quarter of the Committee members left voluntarily over a forty year period, with 16% dying, and 59% attending regularly from 1840 to 1880 63 . Committee members were dedicated and diligent men who willingly gave up their time and energy to prosecute appropriation. Why then did they convict a lower than average proportion of appropriators?
Either the Committee JPs were cautious in their judgements, and showed leniency to defendents, since they anticipated and indeed experienced bitter criticism from prominent sections of West Riding society, or there may have been mechanisms which acted to pre-select the cases that were heard before particular magistrates. If the weakest prosecution cases were arranged to be judged by Worsted Committee members, then the rate of conviction may not have been relatively low, but relatively high. This would only be possible if petty sessions could be managed in this way, which seems unlikely since any magistrate who cared to turn up could sit in on a case. Nevertheless, when sessions were held in magistrates' houses, or in at least one instance inside a magistrate's factory 64 , it may not have been impossible. Fortunately, there are more likely explanations than envisaging the scenario of Worsted Committee members separating the wheat from the chaff before quickly dragging the weakest cases over to sessions to be judged before another magistrate turned up. Only 5% of workplace appropriation cases were judged by two Worsted Committee members sitting together in a summary hearing. It may be that Worsted Committee members strove to avoid such situations lest they be accused of bias against working people. When this situation was unavoidable, perhaps because only two eligible magistrates turned up to sessions that day, and they both belonged to the Worsted Committee, they probably took great pains to apply the law in a transparently fair way. Indeed, two Worsted Committee members, sitting together, may have demonstrated more leniency, whenever that was possible, than other combinations of magistrates were inclined to do.
If the relatively low conviction rates, in cases when two Worsted Committee magistrates presided, is puzzling, the generally high conviction rates in workplace appropriation cases is easier to explain. The editor of the Bradford Observer stated, in 1853, «There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Worsted Acts are exceedingly harsh and oppressive, and that for a very venial fault, and sometimes for no fault at all, men have been subjected to its severe discipline» 65 . In other words, the framing of the Worsted Acts ensured a high conviction rate. For example, the conviction rate for the offence of simple larceny at Bradfrord petty sessions between 1865 and 1870 was 64.0%, while for the larceny of goods valued at less than five shillings it was 62.0% 66 . Both rates, for comparable offences to workplace theft, were relatively low compared to Worsted Act cases. However, in those cases, the prosecution had to establish two relationships -the one between the stolen goods and the accused; and the link between the goods found in the possession of the accused and the their rightful owner. If both of those links could be established, then any reasonable doubt that the accused had not unlawfully taken and carried away the goods was dispelled, and the case was proved. However, since the origin of more anonymous goods, such as woollen waste or finished cloth, were more difficult to determine, and the relationship between rightful owner and the goods found with the accused more tenous, the Worsted Acts were framed ratherdifferently. The prosecution in Worsted Act cases had merely toestablish that the accused could not prove that goods found in his/her possession were not taken from their place of work for the case to be proved. With that in mind, only magistrates who determinely set their face against a prosecution could make a case fail. Moreover, to avoid a successful appeal by the Worsted Committee against the decision, those magistrates had to find some evidential reason to justify their doubting the prosecution's case. Since only a few magistrates were interested in seeking out this doubt, most cases were decided in the Committee's favour, with no need to act upon any biased judgements the magistrate may have held.
VI.
The issue of judicial partiality is a slippery one. The qualitative and quantitative analysis produced in this article suggests in the strongest terms that manufacturing magistrates were keen to convict offending workpeople. Yet the laws against workplace appropriation were tightly framed, and the criteria for conviction were easily met compared to other property offences. These factors are, in themselves, sufficient to cast doubt on overdramatic assertions of judicial bias. Nevertheless, on this, possibly the richest and most full evidence which will ever be available on this issue, the balance of proof lies against the nineteenth-century West Riding industrial magistrates.
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